since Aristotle's nature can be neither the matter, nor the forms, nor the accidents of bodies, it is plain, that, according to his own principles, it must be incorporeal.

21. Now* if the plastic nature be incorporeal, then it must of necessity be either an inferior power or faculty of some soul, which is also conscious, sensitive, or rational; or else a lower substantial life by itself, devoid of animal consciousness. The Platonists seem to ajfirm both these together, namely, that there is a plastic nature lodged in all particular souls of animals, brutes, and men, and also that there is a general plastic or spermatic principle of the whole universe distinct from their higher mundane soul, though subordinate to it, and dependant upon it:[51] *J *Xtyo^ivn* $ikr*c *yiwnp** ^X[1]^ irporlpac Svvarwrcpov £<i><r)}£> That which is called nature, is the offspring of an higher soul, wMch hatt a more powerful life in it*—And tliongh Aristotle do not so clearly acknowledge the incorporeity and substantiality of souls, yet he concurs very much with this Platonic doctrine, that nature is either a lower power, or faculty of some conscious soul, or else an inferior kind of life by itself, depending upon a superior soul. L. i. c. i. *And* this we shall make to appear from p.470.8. his book *De Partibm Ammalmm** after torn. tt. oper.

we nave taken notice of some considerable preliminary passages in it in order thereunto, For having first declared, that besides the material cause, there are other causes also of natural generations, namely, these two, *r< ov traca me ofcv *t

[a] PfotiiL Libr. do Nattira, Contomplatiotic, ct Uno, Biuiead. iii. lib*

-viiL capb ML |>.. 346. open